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Abstract
We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean field type with time inconsistent cost
functionals, and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is extended to a mean field game to construct
decentralized strategies and obtain an estimate of their performance.
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Nash equilibrium, mean field game.
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1 Introduction
In dynamic decision making problems a policy is time consistent if whenever it is optimal at time
t, it remains optimal when implemented at a later time s > t. In optimal control this is known as
the Bellman principle. A time inconsistent policy need not be optimal at later time s > t, even if
it is optimal at time t. Time inconsistency occurs for example when a hyperbolic discount rate is
preferred to an exponential discount rate or when the performance criterion is a nonlinear function
of the expected utility such as the variance in the standard Markowitz investment problem. For
a recent review of time consistency in dynamic decision making problems we refer to Ekeland and
Lazrak (2006), Ekeland and Pirvu (2008), and Zaccour (2008).
In his work on a deterministic Ramsay problem, Strotz (1955) was the first to formulate the
dynamic time inconsistent decision problem as a game theoretic problem where it is natural to look
for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Pollak (1968), Phelps and Pollak (1968), Peleg and Menahem
(1973) and Goldman (1980) extended this framework to discrete and continuous time dynamics.
The recent works by Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) apply this game
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theoretic approach to an optimal investment and consumption problem under hyperbolic discount-
ing for deterministic and stochastic models. Among their achievements, they provide a precise
definition of the equilibrium concept in continuous time, using a Pontryagin type “spike variation”
formulation (that we recall in Section 2 below) and derive among other things, an extension of
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation along with a verification theorem that characterizes
Markov (or feedback type) subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Their work is extended by Bjo¨rk and
Murgoci (2008) and Bjo¨rk, Murgoci and Zhou (2014) to performance functions that are nonlinear
functions of expected utilities for dynamics driven by a quite general class of Markov processes.
Hu et al. (2012) followed by Bensoussan et al. (2013) characterize subgame perfect Nash equilib-
ria using a Pontryagin type stochastic maximum principle (SMP) approach to a time inconsistent
stochastic linear quadratic control problem of mean-field type, where the performance functional
is a conditional expectations with respect to the history Ft of the system up to time t. They
derive a general sufficient condition for equilibria through a new class of flows of forward-backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). The properties of this class of flows of FBSDEs are far
from being well understood and deserve further investigation. Both the extended HJB equation
provided in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2008) and Bjo¨rk, Murgoci and Zhou (2014) and the sufficient con-
dition suggested by Hu et al. (2012) give explicit expression of the equilibria only in very few cases.
In a more recent work, Yong (2013b) studied a class of linear-quadratic models with very general
weight matrices in the cost, and time-consistent equilibrium control is constructed by the stochas-
tic maximum principle approach and Riccati equations. Yong (2013b) also considered closed-loop
equilibrium strategies by discretization of time for the game.
In this paper we suggest an SMP approach to time inconsistent decision problems for dynamics
that is driven by diffusion processes of mean field type that are not necessarily Markov and whose
performance criterion is a nonlinear function of the conditional expectation of a utility function,
given the present location of the state process. We do not condition on the whole history Ft of
the system as in Hu et al. (2012) because for all practical purposes, in the best conditions, the
decision-maker can only observe the current state of the system. She can never provide a complete
and explicit form of the history Ft (which is a σ-algebra) of the system, simply because this is
a huge set of information, except in trivial situations. Our model generalizes the one studied in
Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) and Bjo¨rk et al. (2008, 2014).
In the first main result of the paper the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (not necessarily of
feedback type) are fully characterized as maximizers of the Hamiltonian associated with the system
in a similar fashion as in the SMP for diffusions of mean field type obtained in Andersson and
Djehiche (2010) and Buckdahn et al. (2011). This approach is illustrated by several examples and
the explicit solutions are obtained.
Next, we address the time-inconsistency issue in a mean field game setting which involves N
players in decision making. In a mean field game, the players are individually insignificant and
interact via an aggregate effect (called the mean field effect) generated by the population. There
has existed a substantial literature on this class of games. Huang, Caines, and Malhame´ (2003, 2006,
2007) introduced an approach based on consistent mean field approximations to design decentralized
strategies where each player solves a localized optimal control problem by dynamic programming.
These strategies have an ε-Nash equilibrium property when applied to a large but finite population.
Closely related developments were presented by Lasry and Lions (2007) who introduced the name
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mean field game, and Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) studied oblivious equilibria in a
Markov decision setup. Within the linear quadratic setup, various explicit solutions can be obtained;
see e.g. Huang, Caines, and Malhame´ (2007), Li and Zhang (2008), Bardi (2012), Bensoussan et
al. (2011). Tembine, Zhu and Basar (2011) introduced risk sensitive costs for mean field games,
and analyzed the linear exponential quadratic Gaussian model in detail. For games with dynamics
modelled by nonlinear diffusions, Carmora and Delarue (2013) developed a probabilistic approach,
and Kolokoltsov, Li and Yang (2011) presented a very general mean field game modeling framework
via nonlinear Markov processes. Gomes, Mohr and Souza (2010) considered games with discrete
time and discrete states. For additional information, the reader may consult an overview of this area
by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet, and Quincampoix (2011), and Bensoussan, Frehse, and Yam (2012).
To display an overall picture of various past developments in a mean field context, we briefly
remark on the difference between mean field type optimal control and mean field games. For the
former (see e.g. Andersson and Djehiche (2010), Elliot, Li and Ni (2013), Yong (2013a)), there
is only a single decision maker who can instantly affect the mean of the underlying state process.
In contrast, a player in a mean field game with all comparably small players (called peers) has
little influence on a mean field term such as X(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1Xi although as N → ∞, X(N) may
asymptotically agree with the mean of a representative agent in a uniform population. An exception
is games with a major player whose control can affect everyone notably; see e.g. Huang (2010),
Nourian and Caines (2013).
So far most existing research on mean filed games deals with time consistent cost functionals.
The state feedback strategies based on consistent mean filed approximations are subgame perfect
in the infinite population limit model and so no individual has the incentive to revise its strategy
when time moves forward. In a recent work, Bensoussan, Sung and Yam (2013) considered time-
inconsistent quadratic cost functionals in a mean field game with a continuum population and linear
dynamics. A so-called time consistent optimal strategy is derived based on spike variation which
is followed by a consistency condition on the mean field generated by an infinite population.
The mean field game which we will analyze involves nonlinear dynamics and each player is cost
coupled with others by their average state X(−i) = 1N−1
∑N
k 6=iXk. Time inconsistency arises from
the conditioning in the cost functional. Our approach for strategy design is to use a freezing idea so
that the coupling term is approximated by a deterministic function X¯. This naturally introduces
an optimal control problem with time inconsistent cost which in turn is handled by the SMP
approach. After finding the equilibrium strategy for the limiting control problem, we determine X¯
by a consistency condition. The remaining important issue is to analyze the performance of the
obtained strategies when applied by N players.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we state the SMP approach for our
game problem and the associated adjoint equations. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium point
by an SMP (Theorem 3.1). Section 4 is devoted to some examples illustrating the main results. In
Section 5 we extend the previous results to a system of N decision makers (Theorem 5.1). Section
6 provides the proof of Theorem 5.1. Section 7 presents explicit computations in a mean field LQG
game with time inconsistent costs.
To streamline the presentation, we only consider the one dimensional case for the state. The
extension to the multidimensional case is by now straightforward. For the reader’s convenience, we
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note a convention on notation. The analysis of the mean field game uses C as a generic constant
which may change from place to place, but depends on neither the population size N nor the
parameter ε of the spike variation.
2 Notation and statement of the problem
Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon and (Ω,F , lF, lP) be a given filtered probability space whose
filtration lF = {Fs, 0 ≤ s ≤ T} satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness,
on which a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion W = {Ws}s≥0 is given. We assume that lF
is the natural filtration of W augmented by lP-null sets of F .
An admissible strategy u is an lF-adapted and square-integrable process with values in a non-
empty subset U of lR. We denote the set of all admissible strategies over [0, T ] by U [0, T ].
For each admissible strategy u ∈ U [0, T ], we consider the dynamics given by the following SDE
of mean-field type, defined on (Ω,F , lF, lP),{
dXu(s) = b(s,Xu(s), E[Xu(s)], u(s))ds + σ(s,Xu(s), E[Xu(s)], u(s))dW (s), 0 < s ≤ T,
Xu(0) = x0 (∈ lR),
(2.1)
We consider decision problems related to the following cost functional
J(t, x, u) = E
[∫ T
t
h
(
s,Xu,t,x(s), E[Xu,t,x(s)], u(s)
)
ds+ g
(
Xu,t,x(T ), E[Xu,t,x(T )]
)]
, (2.2)
associated with the state process Xu,t,x, parametrized by (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × lR, whose dynamics is
given by the SDE{
dXu,t,x(s) = b(s,Xu,t,x(s), E[Xu,t,x(s)], u(s))ds + σ(s,Xu,t,x(s), E[Xu,t,x(s)], u(s))dW (s), t < s ≤ T,
Xu,t,x(t) = x (∈ lR),
(2.3)
where,
b(s, y, z, v), σ(s, y, z, v), h(s, y, z, v) : [0, T ]× lR× lR× U −→ lR,
g(y, z) : lR× lR −→ lR, s ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ lR, z ∈ lR, v ∈ U.
We note that Xu,0,x0 = Xu.
The nonlinearity of the cost functional (2.2) in the term E[Xu,t,x(T )] makes the system (2.3)-
(2.2) time-inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman Principle for optimality does not hold, i.e.,
the t-optimal policy
u∗(t, x, ·) := argmin
u∈U
J(t, x, u), (2.4)
may not be optimal after t:
The restriction of u∗(t, x, ·) on [t′, T ] is not equal to argminu J(t′, x′, u) for some t′ > t when
the state process is steered to x′ by u∗. Therefore, as noted by Ekeland, Lazrak and Pirvu (2006)-
(2008), time inconsistent optimal solutions (although they exist mathematically) are irrelevant in
practice. The decision-maker would not implement the t-optimal policy at a later time, if he/she
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is not forced to do so. The review paper by Zaccour (2008) gives a nice guided tour to the concept
of time consistency in differential games.
Following Ekeland et al. (2006)-(2008), and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2008), we may view the problem
as a game and look for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium point uˆ in the following sense:
• Assume that all players (selves) s, such that s > t, use the strategy uˆ(s).
• Then it is optimal for player (self) t to also use uˆ(t).
When the players use feedback strategies, depending on t and on the position x in space, player
t will choose a strategy of the form u(t) := ϕ(t, x), where ϕ is deterministic function, so the action
chosen by player t is given by the mapping x −→ ϕ(t, x). The cost to player t is given by the
functional J(t, x, ϕ). It is clear that J(t, x, ϕ) does not depend on the actions taken by any player
s for s < t, so in fact J does only depend on the restriction of the strategy u to the time interval
[t, T ]. The strategy ϕ can thus be viewed as a complete description of the chosen strategies of all
players in the game.
If feedback strategies are to be used, a deterministic function ϕˆ : [0, T ]× lR −→ U is a sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium point when the following actions are performed:
• Assume that all players (selves) s, such that s > t, use the strategy ϕˆ(s, ·).
• Then it is optimal for player (self) t to also use ϕˆ(t, ·).
To characterize the equilibrium strategy uˆ, Ekeland et al. (2007)-(2008) suggest the following
definition that uses a “local” spike variation in a natural way.
Define the admissible strategy uε as the “local” spike variation of a given admissible strategy
uˆ ∈ U [0, T ] over the set [t, t+ ε],
uε(s) :=


u(s), s ∈ [t, t+ ε],
uˆ(s), s ∈ [t, T ] \ [t, t+ ε],
(2.5)
where u ∈ U [0, T ] and t ∈ [0, T ] are arbitrarily chosen.
Hu et al. (2012) suggest the following open-loop form of the local spike variation:
uε(s) := uˆ(s) + ν1 [t,t+ε](s), s ∈ [t, T ], (2.6)
where ν ∈ U is arbitrarily chosen such that for each s ∈ [t, t+ε], uε(s) ∈ U . This is a particular case
of (2.5), where the arbitrary admissible strategy u over [t, t+ ε] is a deviation from the equilibrium
point uˆ in the direction ν i.e. u(s) = uˆ(s) + ν. Although this form is suitable only when U is
a linear space, it has the advantage of imposing weaker integrability conditions on the admissible
strategies since
uε(s)− uˆ(s) = ν1 [t,t+ε](s), s ∈ [t, T ]. (2.7)
For either form of local spike variation, we have the following
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Definition 2.1. The admissible strategy uˆ is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for the
system (2.2)-(2.3) if
lim
ε↓0
J(t, x, uˆ)− J(t, x, uε)
ε
≤ 0 (2.8)
for all u ∈ U [0, T ], x ∈ lR and a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. The corresponding equilibrium dynamics solves the
SDE{
dX uˆ(s) = b(s,X uˆ(s), E[X uˆ(s)], uˆ(s))ds + σ(s,X uˆ(s), E[X uˆ(s)], uˆ(s))dW (s), 0 < s ≤ T,
X uˆ(0) = x0.
(2.9)
If feedback strategies are to be used, the previous definition reduces to the following
Definition 2.2. A deterministic function ϕˆ : [0, T ] × lR −→ U is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium for the system (2.2)-(2.3) if
lim
ε↓0
J(t, x, uˆ)− J(t, x, uε)
ε
≤ 0 (2.10)
for all u ∈ U [0, T ], x ∈ lR and a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], where uˆ(s) := ϕˆ(s, X¯(s)), 0 ≤ s ≤ T and X¯ is given
by (2.11). The associated equilibrium dynamics solves the SDE{
dX¯(s) = b(s, X¯(s), E[X¯(s)], ϕˆ(s, X¯(s)))ds + σ(s, X¯(s), E[X¯(s)], , ϕˆ(s, X¯(s)))dW (s), 0 < s ≤ T,
X¯(0) = x0.
(2.11)
For brevity, sometimes we simply call uˆ an equilibrium point when there is no ambiguity.
The purpose of this study is to characterize sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the system
(2.3)-(2.2) by evaluating the limit (2.8) in terms of a stochastic maximum principle criterion. We will
apply the general stochastic maximum principle for SDEs of mean-field type derived in Buckdahn
et al. (2011) [11].
The following assumptions (imposed in [11]) will be in force throughout this paper. These
assumptions can be made weaker, but we do not focus on this here.
Assumption 2.1.
(i) The functions b, σ, h, g are continuous in (y, z, u), and bounded.
(ii) The functions b, σ, h, g are twice continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z), and their
derivatives up to the second order are continuous in (y, z, u), and bounded.
Although we are interested in characterizing sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium points by con-
sidering the action of player t at a deterministic position x, we perform the analysis for the more
general case where player t has a random variable ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR) as a state.
For a given admissible strategy u ∈ U [0, T ], if player t has ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR) as state, (2.3)
becomes{
dXu,t,ξ(s) = b(s,Xu,t,ξ(s), E[Xu,t,ξ(s)], u(s))ds + σ(s,Xu,t,ξ(s), E[Xu,t,ξ(s)], u(s))dW (s), t < s ≤ T,
Xu,t,ξ(t) = ξ,
(2.12)
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and the associated cost functional (2.2) becomes
J(t, ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
t
h
(
s,Xu,t,ξ(s), E[Xu,t,ξ(s)], u(s)
)
ds + g
(
Xu,t,ξ(T ), E[Xu,t,ξ(T )]
)]
. (2.13)
Remark 2.1. Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 can be accordingly generalized by replacing (t, x) by (t, ξ)
and the inequality condition takes the form
lim
ε↓0
J(t, ξ, uˆ)− J(t, ξ, uε)
ε
≤ 0 (2.14)
for all u ∈ U [0, T ], ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR) and a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
It is a well-known fact, see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve ([23], pp. 289-290), that under Assumption
(2.1), for any u ∈ U [0, T ], the SDE (2.12) admits a unique strong solution. Moreover, there exists
a constant C > 0 which depends only on the bounds of b, σ and their first derivatives w.r.t. y, z,
such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U [0, T ] and ξ, ξ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), we also have the following
estimates, lP− a.s.
E[supt≤s≤T |Xu,t,ξ(s)|2|Ft] ≤ C(1 + |ξ|2 + E[|ξ|2]),
E[supt≤s≤T |Xu,t,ξ(s)−Xu,t,ξ
′
(s)|2|Ft] ≤ C(|ξ − ξ′|2 + E[|ξ − ξ′|2]).
(2.15)
Moreover, the performance functional (2.13) is well defined and finite.
For convenience, we will use the following notation throughout the paper. We will denote by
Xt,ξ := Xu,t,ξ the solution of the SDE (2.12), associated with the strategy u, and correspondingly,
Xˆt,ξ := X uˆ,t,ξ associated with uˆ.
For ϕ = b, σ, h, g, we define

δϕt,ξ(s) = ϕ(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], u(s)) − ϕ(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], uˆ(s)),
ϕt,ξy (s) =
∂ϕ
∂y (s, Xˆ
t,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], uˆ(s)), ϕt,ξyy (s) =
∂2ϕ
∂y2
(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], uˆ(s)),
ϕt,ξz (s) =
∂ϕ
∂z (s, Xˆ
t,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], uˆ(s)), ϕt,ξzz (s) =
∂2ϕ
∂z2 (s, Xˆ
t,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], uˆ(s)).
(2.16)
Let us introduce the Hamiltonian associated with the r.v. X ∈ L1(Ω,F , lP):
H(s,X, u, p, q) := b(s,X,E[X], u)p + σ(s,X,E[X], u)q − h(s,X,E[X], u). (2.17)
3 Adjoint equations and the stochastic maximum principle
In this section we introduce the adjoint equations involved in the SMP which characterize the
equilibrium points uˆ ∈ U [0, T ] of our problem.
The first order adjoint equation is the following linear backward SDE of mean-field type parametrized
by (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ] × L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), satisfied by the processes (pt,ξ(s), qt,ξ(s)), s ∈ [t, T ],{
dpt,ξ(s) = −{Ht,ξy (s) + E
[
Ht,ξz (s)
]
}ds + qt,ξ(s)dWs,
pt,x(T ) = −gt,ξy (T )− E[gt,ξz (T )],
(3.1)
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where, in view of the notation (2.16), for j = y, z,
Ht,ξj (s) := b
t,ξ
j (s)p
t,ξ(s) + σt,ξj (s)q
t,ξ(s)− ht,ξj (s). (3.2)
This equation reduces to the standard one, when the coefficients do not explicitly depend on the
expected value (or the marginal law) of the underlying diffusion process. Under Assumption 2.1
on b, σ, h, g, by an adaptation of Theorem 3.1. in Buckdahn, Li and Peng (2009), by keeping track
of the parametrization (t, ξ), the equation (3.1) admits a unique lF-adapted solution (pt,ξ, qt,ξ).
Moreover, there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and ξ, ξ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), we
have the following estimate, P−a.s.,
E
[
sups∈[t,T ] |pt,ξ(s)|2 +
∫ T
t |qt,ξ(s)|2 ds|Ft
]
≤ C(1 + |ξ|2 + E[ξ2]). (3.3)
The second order adjoint equation is the classical linear backward SDE, parametrized by (t, ξ) ∈
[0, T ]× L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), that appears in Peng’s stochastic maximum principle (see Peng (1990)):
 dP
t,ξ(s) = −
(
2bt,ξy (s)P t,ξ(s) +
(
σt,ξy (s)
)2
P t,ξ(s) + 2σt,ξy (s)Qt,ξ(s) +H
t,ξ
yy (s)
)
ds+Qt,ξ(s) dWs,
P t,ξ(T ) = −gt,ξyy (T ),
(3.4)
where, in view of (2.16),
Ht,ξyy (s) = b
t,ξ
yy (s)p
t,ξ(s) + σt,ξyy (s)q
t,ξ(s)− ht,ξyy (s). (3.5)
This is a standard linear backward SDE, whose unique lF-adapted solution (P t,ξ, Qt,ξ) satisfies
the following estimate: There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and ξ, ξ′ ∈
L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), we have,
E
[
sups∈[t,T ] |P t,ξ(s)|2 +
∫ T
t |Qt,ξ(s)|2 ds|Ft
]
≤ C(1 + |ξ|2 + E[ξ2]), (3.6)
lP− a.s.
The SDEs (3.1) and (3.4) have a unique solution for a general control u ∈ U [0, T ] and the
corresponding estimates (3.3) and (3.6) hold. However, for Theorem 3.1 below, only the equilibrium
control uˆ is substituted into the two equations. The following theorem is the first main result of
the paper.
Theorem 3.1. (Characterization of equilibrium strategies) Let Assumption (2.1) hold. Then uˆ
is an equilibrium strategy for the system (2.12)-(2.13) if and only if there are pairs of lF-adapted
processes (p, q) and (P,Q) which satisfy (3.1)-(3.3) and (3.4)-(3.6), respectively, and for which
H(t, ξ, v, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t))−H(t, ξ, uˆ(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)) + 12P t,ξ(t) (σ(t, ξ, E[ξ], v) − σ(t, ξ, E[ξ], uˆ(t)))2 ≤ 0,
∀v ∈ U, for all v ∈ U, ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s.
(3.7)
In particular, we have
H(t, x, v, pt,x(t), qt,x(t))−H(t, x, uˆ(t), pt,x(t), qt,x(t)) + 12P t,x(t) (σ(t, x, x, v) − σ(t, x, x, uˆ(t)))2 ≤ 0,
for all v ∈ U, x ∈ lR, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s.
(3.8)
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For feedback strategies, the deterministic function ϕˆ : [0, T ] × lR −→ U is an equilibrium strategy
for the system (2.13)-(2.12) if and only if there are pairs of lF-adapted processes (p, q) and (P,Q)
which satisfy (3.1)-(3.3) and (3.4)-(3.6), respectively, and for which
H(t, x, v, pt,x(t), qt,x(t))−H(t, x, ϕˆ(t, x), pt,x(t), qt,x(t)) + 12P t,x(t) (σ(t, x, x, v) − σ(t, x, x, ϕˆ(t, x)))2 ≤ 0,
for all v ∈ U, x ∈ lR, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s.
(3.9)
Proof. Denote
δHt,ξ(s) := H(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), u(s), pt,ξ(s), qt,ξ(s))−H(t, Xˆt,ξ(s), uˆ(s), pt,ξ(s), qt,ξ(s)) (3.10)
where, the Hamiltonian H is given by (2.17). By Theorem 2.1 in Buckdahn et al. (2011), keeping
track of the the parametrization (t, ξ), the key relation between the cost functional (2.13) and the
associated Hamiltonian (2.17) reads
J(t, ξ, uˆ)− J(t, ξ, uε) = E
[∫ t+ε
t δH
t,ξ(s) + 12P
t,ξ(s)(δσt,ξ(s))2 ds
]
+R(ε), (3.11)
for arbitrary u ∈ U [0, T ] and (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), where
|R(ε)| ≤ ερ¯(ε),
for some function ρ¯ : (0,∞)→ (0,∞) such that ρ¯(ε) ↓ 0 as ε ↓ 0.
Dividing both sides of (3.11) by ε and then passing to the limit ε ↓ 0, in view of Assumption
2.1, (3.3) and (3.6), we get
lim
ε↓0
J(t, ξ, uˆ)− J(t, ξ, uε)
ε
= E
[
δHt,ξ(t) +
1
2
P t,ξ(t)(δσt,ξ(t))2
]
. (3.12)
Now, if (3.7) holds, by setting v := u(t) for arbitrary u ∈ U [0, T ], we also get
H(t, ξ, u(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t))−H(t, ξ, uˆ(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t))
+12P
t,ξ(t) (σ(t, ξ, E[ξ], u(t)) − σ(t, ξ, E[ξ], uˆ(t)))2 ≤ 0, P−a.s.
Therefore, by (3.12) we obtain (2.14), i.e. uˆ is an equilibrium point for the system (2.12)-(2.13).
Conversely, assume that (2.14) holds. Then, in view of (3.12), we have
E
[
δHt,ξ(t) +
1
2
P t,ξ(t)(δσt,ξ(t))2
]
≤ 0, (3.13)
for all u ∈ U [0, T ], ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR) and a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. Now, let A be an arbitrary set of Ft and
set
u(s) := v1A + uˆ(s)1Ω\A, t ≤ s ≤ T,
for an arbitrary v ∈ U . Obviously, u is an admissible strategy. Moreover, we have, for every
s ∈ [t, T ],
δHt,ξ(s) =
(
H(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), v, pt,ξ(s), qt,ξ(s))−H(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), uˆ(s), pt,ξ(s), qt,ξ(s)))
)
1A,
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and
δσt,ξ(s) =
(
σ(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], v) − σ(s, Xˆt,ξ(s), E[Xˆt,ξ(s)], uˆ(s))
)
1A.
Hence, in view of (3.13), we have
E
[(
H(t, Xˆt,ξ(t), v, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t))−H(t, Xˆt,ξ(t), uˆ(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)))1A]
+12E
[
P t,ξ(t)
(
σ(t, Xˆt,ξ(t), E[Xˆt,ξ(t)], v) − σ(t, Xˆt,ξ(t), E[Xˆt,ξ(t)], uˆ(t)))21A] ≤ 0,
which in turn yields the inequality (3.7) since v ∈ U and the set A ∈ Ft are arbitrary.
Finally, both (3.8) and (3.9) follow from (3.7), by replacing ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR) with x ∈ lR.
Remark 3.1. Define the so-called H-function associated with (uˆ(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t), P t,ξ(t))
H(t, ξ, v) := H(t, ξ, v, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t))− 12P t,ξ(t)σ2(t, ξ, E[ξ], uˆ(t))
+12P
t,ξ(t) (σ(t, ξ, E[ξ], v) − σ(t, ξ, E[ξ], uˆ(t)))2 .
Then, it is easily checked that the inequality (3.7) is equivalent to
H(t, ξ, uˆ(t)) = max
v∈U
H(t, ξ, v), for all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s. (3.14)
For all practical purposes, it would be nice to find or characterize equilibrium points, through
only maximizing the Hamiltonian H, which amounts to only solving the first order adjoint equation
(3.1). In fact, this happens in the special case where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the
control variable, i.e.,
σ(s, y, z, v) ≡ σ(s, y, z), (s, y, z, v) ∈ [0, T ]× lR× lR× U,
whence, manifestly, the inequality (3.7) is equivalent to
H(t, ξ, uˆ(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)) = max
v∈U
H(t, ξ, v, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)),
for all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s.
Another very useful case, which we will use in some examples below, is described in the following
Proposition 3.1. Assume that U is a convex subset of lR, and the coefficients b, σ and h satisfy
the assumption 2.1, and are such that H(t, y, ·, p, q) is concave for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × lR almost
surely. Then, the admissible strategy uˆ is an equilibrium point for the system (2.12)-(2.13) if and
only if there is a pair of lF-adapted processes
(
pt,ξ, qt,ξ
)
that satisfies (3.1)-(3.3) and for which
H(t, ξ, uˆ(t), pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)) = max
v∈U
H(t, ξ, v, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)),
for all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s.
Proof. In view of (3.14) it suffices to show that H and H have the same Clark’s generalized gradient
in uˆ. But, this follows e.g. from Lemma 5.1. in Yong and Zhou (1999), since U is a convex subset
of lR and H(t, y, ·, p, q) is concave for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × lR almost surely. Hence, uˆ is a maximizer
of H(t, ξ, ·, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)) if and only if it is a maximizer of H(t, ξ, ·, pt,ξ(t), qt,ξ(t)).
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Remark 3.2. In fact both Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 extend to the following cost functionals
parametrized by (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(Ω,Ft, lP; lR) :
J(t, ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
t
h
(
t, ξ, s,Xt,ξ(s), E[Xt,ξ(s)], u(s)
)
ds+ g
(
t, ξ,Xt,ξ(T ), E[Xt,ξ(T )]
)]
,
where both h and g are allowed to explicitly depend on (t, x). This is due to the fact that the spike
variation and the subsequent Taylor expansions that are used to derive (3.11) are not affected by
this extra dependence of h and g on (t, ξ).
4 Some applications
In this section we illustrate the above results through some examples discussed in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci
(2008) and Bjo¨rk, Murgoci and Zhou (2011), using an extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
In these examples, we look for equilibrium strategies of feedback-type i.e. deterministic function
ϕˆ : [0, T ]× lR −→ U which satisfy (3.9). The corresponding equilibrium point is uˆ(s) := ϕˆ(s, Xˆ(s)),
where, Xˆ is corresponding to the equilibrium dynamics given by the SDE{
dXˆ(s) = b(s, Xˆ(s), E[Xˆ(s)], ϕ(s, Xˆ(s)))ds + σ(s, Xˆ(s), E[Xˆ(s)], ϕ(s, Xˆ(s)))dW (s), 0 < s ≤ T,
Xˆ(0) = x0.
4.1 Mean-variance portfolio selection with constant risk aversion
The dynamics over [0, T ] defined on (Ω,F , lF, lP) is given by the following SDE:
dX(s) = (rX(s) + (α− r) u(s)) ds + σu(s)dW (s), X(0) = x0 (∈ lR), (4.1)
where r, α and σ are real constants.
The cost functional is given by
J(t, x, u) = γ2V ar(X
t,x(T ))− E[Xt,x(T )]
= E
(
γ
2
(
Xt,x(T )
)2 −Xt,x(T ))− γ2 (E[Xt,x(T )])2 , (4.2)
where the constant γ, assumed positive, is the risk aversion coefficient. The associate dynamics,
parametrized by (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × lR is
dXt,x(s) =
(
rXt,x(s) + (α− r)u(s)) ds+ σu(s)dW (s), t < s ≤ T, Xt,x(t) = x. (4.3)
The Hamiltonian associated to this system is
H(t, x, u, p, q) = (rx+ (α− r)u) p+ σuq,
and the H-function is
H(t, x, v) := H(t, x, v, p, q) − 12P (σϕˆ(t, x))2 + 12Pσ2 (v − ϕˆ(t, x))2 .
11
The equation for P takes the form
dP t,x(s) = −2rP t,x(s)ds+Qt,x(s)dWs, (4.4)
where P t,x(T ) = −γ. We obtain P t,x(s) = −γe2r(T−s) for s ∈ [t, T ].
In view of Remark 3.1, ϕˆ is a equilibrium point if and only if it maximizes the H-function. Such
a maximum exists if and only if
(α− r)p+ σq = 0. (4.5)
Therefore, to characterize the equilibrium points, we only need to consider the first-order adjoint
equation: 

dpt,x(s) = −rpt,x(s)ds + qt,x(s)dW (s),
pt,x(T ) = 1− γ
(
Xˆt,x(T )−E[Xˆt,x(T )]
)
.
(4.6)
We try a solution of the form
pt,x(s) = Cs −As
(
Xˆt,x(s)− E[Xˆt,x(s)]
)
, (4.7)
where As and Cs are deterministic functions such that
AT = γ, CT = 1.
Identifying the coefficients in (4.3) and (4.6), we get, for s ≥ t,
(2rAs + A˙s)
(
Xˆt,x(s)− E[Xˆt,x(s)]
)
+ (α− r)As(ϕˆ(s, Xˆt,x(s))− E[ϕˆ(s, Xˆt,x(s))]) = C˙s + rCs,
(4.8)
qt,x(s) = −Asσϕˆ(s, Xˆt,x(s)). (4.9)
In view of (4.5), we have
(α− r)pt,x(t) + σqt,x(t) = 0. (4.10)
Now, from (4.7), we have
pt,x(t) = Ct,
which is deterministic and independent of x. Hence, from (4.5) we get
qt,x(t) = −α− r
σ
Ct.
In view of (4.9), the equilibrium point is the deterministic function
ϕˆ(s) :=
α− r
σ2
Cs
As
, 0 ≤ s ≤ T. (4.11)
It remains to determine As and Cs.
Indeed, inserting (4.11) in (4.8) we obtain
(A˙s + 2rAs)(Xˆ(s)− E[Xˆt,x(s)]) = C˙s + rCs,
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giving the equations satisfied by As and Cs{
A˙s + 2rAs = 0, AT = γ,
C˙s + rCs = 0, CT = 1.
The solutions of these equations are
As = γe
2r(T−s), Cs = e
r(T−s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
Whence, we obtain the following explicit form of the equilibrium point:
ϕˆ(s) =
1
γ
α− r
σ2
e−r(T−s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
which is identical to the one obtained in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2008) by solving an extended HJB
equation.
4.2 Mean-variance portfolio selection with state dependent risk aversion
Consider the same state process over [0, T ] as in Section 4.1. Namely,
dX(s) = (rX(s) + (α− r)u(s)) ds+ σu(s)dW (s), X(0) = x0, (4.12)
where r, α and σ are real constants. The modified cost functional takes the form
J(t, x, u) = γ(x)2 V ar(X
t,x(T ))− E[Xt,x(T )],
where the risk aversion coefficient γ(x) is made dependent on the current wealth x. We refere to
Bjo¨rk et al. (2011) for an economic motivation of this dependence.
The associated dynamics, parametrized by (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× lR is
dXt,x(s) =
(
rXt,x(s) + (α− r)u(s)) ds+ σu(s)dW (s), t < s ≤ T, Xt,x(t) = x. (4.13)
Now, since γ(x) is assumed strictly positive for all x, the equilibrium points of J are the same
as the ones of the the cost functional
J¯(t, x, u) =
1
2
V ar(Xt,x(T ))− γ−1(x)E[Xt,x(T )]. (4.14)
Therefore, we will find feedback equilibrium points associated with (4.14).
The Hamiltonian associated to this system is
H(t, x, u, p, q) = (rx+ (α− r)u) p+ σuq.
and the H-function is
H(t, x, v) := H(t, x, v, p, q) − 12P (σϕˆ(t, x))2 + 12Pσ2 (v − ϕˆ(t, x))2 .
Again, in view of Remark 3.1, ϕˆ is a equilibrium point if and only if it maximizes the H-function.
Such a maximum exists if and only if
(α− r)p+ σq = 0. (4.15)
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Therefore, to characterize the equilibrium points, we only need to consider the first-order adjoint
equation: 

dpt,x(s) = −rpt,x(s)ds + qt,x(s)dW (s),
pt,x(T ) = γ−1(x)−
(
Xˆt,x(T )− E[Xˆt,x(T )]
)
,
(4.16)
We try a solution of the form
pt,x(s) = Csγ
−1(x)−As
(
Xˆt,x(s)− E[Xˆt,x(s)]
)
, (4.17)
where As, Bs and Cs are deterministic functions such that
AT = CT = 1.
Identifying the coefficients in (4.13) and (4.16), we get for s ≥ t,
(A˙s + 2rAs)
(
Xˆt,x(s)− E[Xˆt,x(s)]
)
+ (α− r)As
(
ϕˆ(s, Xˆt,x(s))−E[ϕˆ(s, Xˆt,x(s))]
)
= (C˙s + rCs)γ
−1(x),
(4.18)
qt,x(s) = −Asσϕ(s, Xˆt,x(s)), (4.19)
and, by (4.15), we have
(α− r)pt,x(t) + σqt,x(t) = 0, (4.20)
But, from (4.17) we have
pt,x(t) = Ctγ
−1(x).
Therefore, we get from (4.20)
qt,x(t) = −α− r
σ
Ctγ
−1(x), (4.21)
which together with (4.19), suggest that an equilibrium point ϕˆ of the form
ϕˆ(s, y) =
α− r
σ2
Cs
As
γ−1(y), 0 ≤ s ≤ T. (4.22)
It remains to determine As and Cs.
Indeed, inserting (4.22) in (4.18) we obtain,
(A˙s + 2rAs)
(
Xˆt,x(s)− E[Xˆt,x(s)]
)
+ (α−r)
2
σ2
Cs
(
γ−1(Xˆt,x(s))− E[γ−1(Xˆt,x(s))]
)
= (C˙s + rCs)γ
−1(x).
(4.23)
Manifestly, from (4.23) it is hard to draw any conclusion about the form of the deterministic
functions As and Cs unless we have an explicit form of the function γ(x). In fact, a closer look
at (4.23) suggests that a feasible identification of the coefficients is possible, for instance, when
γ(x) = γ/x. Let us examine this case.
The case γ(x) = γx
Let us consider the particular case when
γ(x) =
γ
x
.
In this special case, (4.23) becomes
(A˙s + 2rAs +
(α−r)2
γσ2
Cs)
(
Xt,x(s)− E[Xt,x(s)]) − (C˙s + rCs)xγ = 0.
This suggests that the functions As, Bs and Cs solve the following system of equations:

A˙s + 2rAs +
(α−r)2
γσ2
Cs = 0,
C˙s + rCs = 0,
AT = CT = 1,
(4.24)
which admits the following explicit solution:
As = e
2r(T−s) +
(α− r)2
rγσ2
(
e2r(T−s) − er(T−s)
)
, Cs = e
r(T−s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
Hence, the equilibrium point ϕˆ explicitly given by
ϕˆ(s, y) = α−rγσ2
Cs
As
y
= α−r
γσ2
(
er(T−s) + (α−r)
2
rγσ2
(
er(T−s) − 1))−1 y, (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× lR.
4.3 Time-inconsistent linear-quadratic regulator
We consider the following variant of a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic regulator discussed in
Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2008). We refer to recent work by Bensoussan et al. (2013), Yong (2013a), and
Hu et al. (2012), where more general models are considered. The state process over [0, T ] defined
on (Ω,F , lF, lP) is a scalar with dynamics
dX(s) = (aX(s) + bu(s)) ds+ σdW (s), X(0) = x0, (4.25)
where a, b and σ are real constants. The cost functional is given by
J(t, x, u) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
t
u2(s) ds
]
+
γ
2
E
[(
Xt,x(T )− x)2] ,
where γ is a positive constant. The associated dynamics, parametrized by (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× lR is
dXt,x(s) =
(
aXt,x(s) + bu(s)
)
ds+ σdW (s), t < s ≤ T, Xt,x(t) = x. (4.26)
As mentioned in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2008), in this time-inconsistent version of the linear-
quadratic regulator, we want to control the system so that the final state Xt,x(T ) stays as close
as possible to Xt,x(t) = x, while at the same time we keep the control energy (expressed by the
integral term) small. The time-inconsistency stems from the fact that the target point Xt,x(t) = x
is changing with time.
15
The Hamiltonian associated to this system is
H(s, x, u, p, q) := (ax+ bu) p+ σq − 12u2. (4.27)
and the H-function is
H(t, x, v) := H(t, x, v, p, q) − 12Pσ2
Again, in view of Remark 3.1, ϕˆ is a equilibrium point if and only if it maximizes the H-function.
Such a maximizer is
ϕˆ = bp. (4.28)
Therefore, to characterize the equilibrium points, we only need to consider the first-order adjoint
equation: 

dpt,x(s) = −apt,x(s)ds+ qt,x(s)dW (s),
pt,x(T ) = γ(x−Xt,x(T )).
(4.29)
We try a solution of the form
pt,x(s) = βsx− αsXˆt,x(s), (4.30)
where αs and βs are deterministic functions such that
αT = βT = γ.
Identifying the coefficients in (4.26) and (4.29), we get, for s ≥ t,
(α˙s + 2aαs)Xˆ
t,x(s) + bαsϕˆ(s, Xˆ
t,x(s)) = (β˙s + aβs)x, (4.31)
and
qt,x(s) = −σαs.
On the other hand, in view of (4.28)
ϕˆ(t, x) = bpt,x(t).
Thus, by (4.30), the function ϕ which yields the equilibrium point has the form
ϕˆ(s, y) = b(βs − αs)y, (s, y) ∈ [0, T ] × lR. (4.32)
Therefore, (4.31) reduces to
(α˙s + (2a+ b
2βs)αs − b2α2s)Xˆt,x(s) = (β˙s + aβs)x,
suggesting that (αs, βs) solves the system of equations

β˙s + aβs = 0,
α˙s + (2a+ b
2βs)αs − b2α2s = 0,
αT = γ, βT = γ.
(4.33)
The first equation in (4.33) yields the solution
βs = γe
a(T−s).
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The second equation is of Riccati type whose solution is αs :=
vs
ws
, where (v,w) solves the following
system of linear differential equation:(
v˙s
w˙s
)
=
(
−2a 0
−b2 b2βs
)(
vs
ws
)
,
(
vT
wT
)
=
(
γ
1
)
.
which is obviously solvable.
5 Extension to mean-field game models
In this section we extend the SMP approach to an N -player stochastic differential game of mean-
field type where the i-th player would like to find a strategy to optimize her own cost functional
regardless of the other players’ cost functionals.
Let X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) describe the states of the N players and u = (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈ ΠNi=1Ui[0, T ]
be the ensemble of all the individual admissible strategies. Each ui takes values in a non-empty
subset Ui of lR and the class of admissible strategies is given by
Ui[0, T ] =
{
ui : [0, T ] × Ω −→ Ui; ui is lF-adapted and square integrable
}
. (5.1)
To simplify the analysis, we consider a population of uniform agents so that Ui = U and they have
the same initial state Xi(0) = x0 at time 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In this case, the N sets Ui[0, T ]
are identical and equal to U [0, T ] . Let the dynamics be given by the following SDE:
dXi(s) = b(s,Xi(s), E[Xi(s)], ui(s))ds + σ(s,Xi(s), E[Xi(s)])dWi(s), (5.2)
where the strategy ui does not enter the diffusion coefficient σ.
For notational simplicity, we do not explicitly indicate the dependence of the state on the control
by writing Xuii (s). We take F to be the natural filtration of the N -dimensional standard Brownian
motion (W1, . . . ,WN ) augmented by P-null sets of F .
Denote
(u−i, v) := (u1, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN ), i = 1, . . . , N.
Then, the i-th player selects ui ∈ U [0, T ] to evaluate her cost functional
v 7→ J i,N (t, xi;u−i, v) := J i,N (t, xi;u1, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN ),
where, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
J i,N (t, xi;u) = E
[∫ T
t h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)],X
(−i)(s), ui(s)
)
ds
+ g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )],X
(−i)(T )
)]
,
(5.3)
whose associated dynamics, parametrized by (t, xi), is{
dXt,xii (s) = b(s,X
t,xi
i (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], ui(s))ds+ σ(s,X
t,xi
i (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)])dWi(s), t < s ≤ T,
Xt,xi(t) = xi.
(5.4)
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The i-th player interacts with others through the mean-field coupling term
X(−i) =
1
N − 1
N∑
k 6=i
Xk, i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
which models the aggregate impact of all other players.
Note that the i-th player assesses her cost functional over [t, T ] seen from her local state Xi(t) =
xi and she knows only the initial states of all other players at time 0, (Xk(0) = x0, k 6= i). Thus the
game may be cast as a decision problem where each player has incomplete state information about
other players. The development of a solution framework in terms of a certain exact equilibrium
notion is challenging. Our objective is to address this incomplete state information issue and design
a set of individual strategies which has a meaningful interpretation. This will be achieved by using
the so-called consistent mean-field approximation.
For a large N , even if each player has full state information of the system, the exact characteriza-
tion of the equilibrium points, based on the SMP, will have high complexity since one needs to solve
a very high dimensional system of coupled variational inequalities for the underlying Hamiltonians
similar to (3.7). Therefore, we should rely on the mean-field approximation of our system.
We note that J i,N depends on not only ui, but also all other players’ strategies u−i through the
mean-field coupling term X(−i). This suggests that we extend Definition 2.1 to the N -player case
as follows.
Definition 5.1. The admissible strategy uˆ = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) is an asymptotic (in population size N)
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium point for the system (5.2)-(5.3) if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
lim
ε↓0
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, uεi )
ε
≤ O(δN ), (5.5)
for each given ui ∈ Ui[0, T ], xi ∈ lR and a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], where uεi is the spike variation (2.5) of the
strategy uˆi of the i-th player using ui and 0 ≤ δN → 0 as N →∞.
The error term O(δN ) is due to the mean field approximation to be introduced below for
designing uˆ.
5.1 The local limiting decision problem
Let X(−i) be approximated by a deterministic function X¯(s) on [0, T ]. Denote the cost functional
J¯ i(t, xi;ui) = E
[∫ T
t h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], X¯(s), ui(s)
)
ds
+g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )], X¯(T )
)] (5.6)
which is intended as an approximation of J i,N . Note that once X¯ is assumed fixed, J¯ i is affected
only by ui. The introduction of X¯ as a fixed function of time is based on the freezing idea in
mean field games. The reason is that X(−i) = 1N−1
∑N
k=1Xk is generated by many negligibly small
players, and therefore a given player has little influence on it.
The strategy selection of the i-th player is based on finding a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
for J¯ i to which the method based on the Stochastic Maximum Principle (cf. (3.8)) of Section 3 can
be applied under the following conditions:
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Assumption 5.1.
(i) The functions b, σ, h, g are continuous in (y, z, u), and bounded.
(ii) The functions b, σ are twice continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z), and their deriva-
tives up to the second order are continuous in (y, z, u), and bounded.
(iii) The functions h, g are twice continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z, w), and their
derivatives up to the second order are continuous in (x, y, w, u), and bounded.
Let uˆi ∈ U [0, T ] be a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium point for (5.3)-(5.4) and denote the
associated backward SDE{
dpt,xi(s) = −{Ht,xiy (s) + E[Ht,xiz (s)]}ds + qt,xi(s)dWi(s),
pt,xi(T ) = −gt,xiy (T )− E[gt,xiz (T )], (5.7)
where for ζ = y, z,
Ht,xiζ (s) = bζ(s, Xˆ
t,xi
i (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], uˆi)p
t,xi(s) + σζ(s, Xˆ
t,xi
i (s), E [ˆX
t,xi
i (s)])q
t,xi(s)
−hζ(s, Xˆt,xii , E[Xˆt,xii ], X¯(s), uˆi),
for which
H(t, xi, v, p
t,xi(t), qt,xi(t))−H(t, xi, uˆi(t), pt,xi(t), qt,xi(t)) ≤ 0,
∀v ∈ U, xi ∈ lR, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s.
(5.8)
The closed-loop equilibrium state associated to uˆi of the i-th player is given by
dXˆi(s) = b(s, Xˆi(s), E[Xˆi(s)], uˆi(s))ds + σ(s, Xˆi(s), E[Xˆi(s)])dWi(s). (5.9)
Since uˆi does not depend on the Brownian motions of the other N − 1 players, it is a decentralized
strategy, i.e., the processes {uˆk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N} are independent. Further, we impose
Assumption 5.2. All the processes {uˆk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N} have the same law.
This restriction ensures that {Xˆi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are i.i.d. random processes. By the Law of Large
Numbers, the consistency condition on X¯ reads
X¯(s) = E[Xˆ1(s)], ∀s ∈ [0, T ]. (5.10)
A question of central interest is how to characterize the performance of the set of strategies
uˆ = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) when they are implemented and assessed according to the original cost functionals
{J i,N , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. An answer is provided in the following theorem whose proof is displayed in the
next section. This is the second main result of the paper.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions (5.1) and (5.2), we have
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, uεi ) = J¯ i(t, xi; uˆi)− J¯ i(t, xi;uεi ) +O
(
ε√
N − 1
)
. (5.11)
Moreover, uˆ = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) ∈
∏N
i=1 U [0, T ] is an asymptotic sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for
the system (5.2)-(5.3) where δN = O(1/
√
N).
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6 Proof of Theorem 5.1
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5.1. We first establish some performance estimates
which will be used to conclude the proof of the theorem.
6.1 The performance estimate
We have
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ) = Et,xi
[∫ T
t h(s, Xˆ
t,xi
i (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], Xˆ
(−i)(s), uˆi(s))ds
+g(Xˆt,xii (T ), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (T )], Xˆ
(−i)(T ))
]
.
Now we fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and change uˆi to uεi when all other players apply uˆ−i, where
uεi (s) :=
{
ui(s), s ∈ [t, t+ ε],
uˆi(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\[t, t+ ε],
and ui ∈ U [0, T ]. We have
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, u
ε
i ) = E
[∫ T
t h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], Xˆ
(−i)(s), uεi (s)
)
ds
+g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )], Xˆ
(−i)(T )
)]
,
(6.1)
where Xt,xii is the solution of (5.4) with admissible strategy u
ε
i . The following estimates will be
frequently used in the sequel.
Lemma 6.1. For the i-th player, let Xi and Xˆi be the state processes corresponding to u
ε
i and uˆi
respectively. Then
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|2
]
≤ Cε2,
where C does not depend on (t, xi).
Proof. Using the SDEs (5.4) for the two state processes, we have
Xt,xii (τ)− Xˆt,xii (τ) =
∫ τ
t
{
b
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], u
ε
i (s)
)
− b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], uˆi(s)
)}
ds
+
∫ τ
t
{
σ
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)]
)
− σ
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)]
)}
dWi(s).
By Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality, we have
E[supt≤τ≤T |Xt,xii (τ)− Xˆt,xii (τ)|2]
≤ CE
[( ∫ T
t
∣∣∣b(s,Xt,xii (s), E[Xt,xii (s)], uεi (s))− b(s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆt,xii (s)], uˆi(s))∣∣∣ ds)2
]
+CE
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣σ (s,Xt,xii (s), E[Xt,xii (s)]) − σ (s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆt,xii (s)])∣∣∣2 ds
]
=: C(Ib + Iσ),
where C is a positive constant.
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Noting that, in view of Assumption (5.1-(i)), if the positive constant C denotes the bound of b,
we have
|b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], u
ε
i (s)
)
− b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], uˆi(s)
)
|
= |b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], ui(s)
)
− b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], uˆi(s)
)
|1 [t,t+ε](s)
≤ C1 [t,t+ε](s),
Thus, since b is Lipschitz in (y, z), by Assumption (5.1-(ii)), we have
|b
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], u
ε
i (s)
)
− b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], uˆi(s)
)
|
≤ |b
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], u
ε
i (s)
)
− b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], u
ε
i (s)
)
|
+|b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], u
ε
i (s)
)
− b
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], uˆi(s)
)
|
≤ C
(
|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|+ E[|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|] + 1 [t,t+ε](s)
)
.
(6.2)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields
Ib ≤ C(T − t)
∫ T
t
E[|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|2]ds + CE
[( ∫ T
t
1 [t,t+ε](s)ds
)2]
≤ C
∫ T
t
E[ sup
t≤η≤s
|Xt,xii (η) − Xˆt,xii (η)|2]ds + Cε2. (6.3)
In a similar fashion, since σ is Lipschitz in (y, z), by Assumption (5.1-(ii)), we obtain
Iσ ≤ C
∫ T
t
E
[
sup
t≤η≤s
|Xt,xii (η)− Xˆt,xii (η)|2
]
ds. (6.4)
Therefore,
E
[
supt≤τ≤T |Xt,xii (τ)− Xˆt,xii (τ)|2
] ≤ C ∫ Tt [E[supt≤η≤s |Xt,xii (η)− Xˆt,xii (η)|2]ds+ Cε2.
The lemma follows from Gronwall’s lemma.
Lemma 6.2. We have
E[ sup
0≤s≤T
|Xˆi(s)|2] ≤ CE
[
|Xˆi(0)|2 + 1
]
.
Proof. We write
Xˆi(s) = Xˆi(0) +
∫ s
0
b(τ, Xˆi(τ), E[Xˆi(τ)], uˆi(τ))dτ +
∫ s
0
σ(τ, Xˆi(τ), E[Xˆi(τ)])dWi(τ). (6.5)
Then, by Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality, we have
E[ sup
0≤s≤T
|Xˆi(s)|2] ≤ C
(
E|Xˆi(0)|2 + E
[ ∫ T
0
|b(s, Xˆi(s), E[Xˆi(s)], uˆi(s))|ds
]2)
+CE
∫ T
0
|σ(s, Xˆi(s), E[Xˆi(s)])|2ds.
By the Lipschitz condition on b and σ (their derivatives w.r.t (y, z) being bounded), we further
obtain
E[sup0≤s≤T |Xˆi(s)|2] ≤ C
(
E|Xˆi(0)|2 + 1 +
∫ T
0 E[sup0≤η≤s |Xˆi(η)|2
)
which combined with Gronwall’s lemma yields the desired estimate.
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Corollary 6.1. We have, for N ≥ 2,
sup
0≤s≤T
E[|Xˆ(−i)(s)− X¯(s)|2] ≤ C
N − 1 ,
where C does not depend on N .
Proof. Thanks to Assumption (5.2), Xˆ1, . . . XˆN are i.i.d. processes. The estimate follows from
Lemma 6.2.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
In order to estimate J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, uεi ), we introduce some notation. Let
∆h(s) = h
(
s, Xˆt,xi (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], Xˆ
(−i)(s), uˆi(s)
)
−h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], Xˆ
(−i)(s), uεi (s)
)
,
∆g = g
(
Xˆt,xii (T ), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (T )], Xˆ
(−i)(T )
)
− g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )], Xˆ
(−i)(T )
)
.
We have
∆h(s) =
[
h
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], X¯(s), uˆi(s)
)
− h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], X¯(s), u
ε
i (s)
)]
+
{[
h
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], Xˆ
(−i)(s), uˆi(s)
)
− h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], Xˆ
(−i)(s), uεi (s)
)]
−
[
h
(
s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], X¯(s), uˆi(s)
)
− h
(
s,Xt,xii (s), E[X
t,xi
i (s)], X¯(s), u
ε
i (s)
)]}
=: ∆h1 +∆h2.
Similarly,
∆g =
[
g
(
Xˆt,xii (T ), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (T )], X¯(T )
)
− g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )], X¯(T )
)]
+
{[
g
(
Xˆt,xii (T ), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (T )], Xˆ
(−i)(T )
)
− g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )], Xˆ
(−i)(T )
)]
−
[
g
(
Xˆt,xii (T ), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (T )], X¯(T )
)
− g
(
Xt,xii (T ), E[X
t,xi
i (T )], X¯(T )
)]}
=: ∆g1 +∆g2.
Now, noting that
E
[∫ T
t
∆h1(s)ds +∆g1
]
= J¯ i(t, xi; uˆi)− J¯ i(t, xi;uεi ), (6.6)
the cost difference satisfies
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, uεi ) = J¯ i(t, xi; uˆi)− J¯ i(t, xi;uεi ) + E
[∫ T
t
∆h2(s)ds +∆g2
]
. (6.7)
We proceed to estimate
E
[∫ T
t
∆h2(s)ds +∆g2
]
.
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Lemma 6.3. We have ∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
t
∆h2(s)ds+∆g2
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cε√N − 1 . (6.8)
Proof. We will only estimate E
[∫ T
t ∆h2(s)ds
]
. The second term may be handled in a similar
fashion. Let
α(w) := h(s, Xˆt,xii (s), E[Xˆ
t,xi
i (s)], w, uˆi(s))− h(s,Xt,xii (s), E[Xt,xii (s)], w, uεi (s))
and
λ(s) := Xˆ(−i)(s)− X¯(s).
Then we have
∆h2(s) = α(Xˆ
(−i)(s))− α(X¯(s)) = λ(s)
∫ 1
0
αw
(
X¯(s) + θ
[
Xˆ(−i)(s)− X¯(s)
])
dθ. (6.9)
Noting that by Assumption (5.1-(iii)) on h, we may perform similar calculations leading to (6.2) to
obtain
|αw(w)| ≤ C
[
|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|+ E[|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|] + 1 [t,t+ε](s)
]
.
Therefore,
|∆h2(s)| ≤ C|λ(s)|
[
|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|+ E[|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|] + 1 [t,t+ε](s)
]
.
Therefore, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get
E
∫ T
t
|∆h2(s)|ds ≤ C
∫ T
t
(E[|λ(s)|2])1/2
(
(E[|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|2])1/2 + 1 [t,t+ε](s)
)
ds
≤ C( sup
0≤s≤T
E|λ(s)|2)1/2(E[ sup
t≤s≤T
|Xt,xii (s)− Xˆt,xii (s)|2])1/2 + ε).
Subsequently by Lemma 6.1 and Corollary 6.1,∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
t
∆h2(s)ds
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cε√N − 1 .
Finally, we combine Lemma 6.3 and the relation (6.7) to conclude
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, uεi ) = J¯ i(t, xi; uˆi)− J¯ i(t, xi;uεi ) +O
(
ε√
N − 1
)
.
Furthermore, since uˆ is determined by (5.7)-(5.10),
lim
ε↓0
J¯ i(t, xi; uˆi)− J¯ i(t, xi;uεi )
ε
≤ 0,
we finally get
lim
ε↓0
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ−i, uεi )
ε
≤ C√
N − 1 .
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
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7 A mean field LQG game
Consider a system of N players. The dynamics of the i-th player is given by
dXi(t) = (aXi(s) + bui(s))ds + σdWi(s), 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (7.1)
Denote x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and u = (u1, . . . , uN ). Its cost functional at time t is
J i,N (t, xi;u) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
t
u2i (s)ds
]
+
γ
2
E
[
Xt,xii (T )− Γ1xi − Γ2X(−i)(T )
]2
,
where X(−i)(t) = 1N−1
∑N
k 6=iXk(t). We take Γ1 6= 0 and Γ2 6= 0. A simple interpretation of the
terminal cost is that each agent wants to adjust its terminal state based on its current state and
also the mean field term X(−i) at time T . The cost functional is time inconsistent. Below, we will
apply a consistent mean field approximation to construct a limiting control problem.
Following the scheme in Section 5, we introduce X¯T as an approximation of X
(−i)(T ). The new
cost functional is
J¯ i(t, xi;ui) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
t
u2i (s)ds
]
+
γ
2
E
[
Xt,xii (T )− Γ1xi − Γ2X¯T
]2
.
This is a time-inconsistent control problem. The same approach as in Section 4.3 can be applied.
The adjoint equation now reads{
dpt,xi(s) = −apt,xi(s)ds+ qt,xi(s)dWi(s),
pt,xi(T ) = γ(Γ1xi + Γ2X¯T −Xt,xii (T )).
We look for a solution of the form
pt,xi(s) = βs(Γ1xi + Γ2X¯T )− αsXt,xii (s).
The same set of ODEs is obtained as in Section 4.3. The equilibrium strategy is given in the
feedback form
uˆi(t) = bp
t,xi(t) = −b(αt − βtΓ1)xi + bβtΓ2X¯T (7.2)
when the current state is xi. The closed loop equilibrium dynamics of the i-th player is
dXˆi(s) = [a− b2(αs − βsΓ1)]Xˆi(s)ds+ bβsΓ2X¯Tds+ σdWi(s). (7.3)
Finally, we impose the consistency requirement. Assume all players have the same initial con-
dition y0, and so X¯T can be obtained as EXˆi(T ). Now we take expectation in (7.3) to construct
the ODE
m˙(s) = [a− b2(αs − βsΓ1)]m(s) + bβsΓ2X¯T , m(0) = y0.
By obvious notation for the transition function Φ, we write the solution of the ODE as
m(t) = Φ(t, 0)y0 +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, s)bβsΓ2X¯T ds.
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Now the consistency condition for X¯ becomes
X¯T = Φ(T, 0)y0 +
∫ T
0
Φ(T, s)bβsΓ2X¯T ds.
For this approach to have a solution for any given y0, we need
bΓ2
∫ T
0
Φ(T, s)βsds 6= 1. (7.4)
If (7.4) holds, we can solve X¯T first and next determine the strategy (7.2).
7.1 The performance difference
Suppose (7.4) holds. For the performance estimate, we consider the following set of admissible
strategies
U0[0, T ] :=
{
u : [0, T ]× Ω −→ lR; u is lF-adapted, E[ess sup 0≤s≤T |u(s)|2] <∞
}
,
which is smaller than U [0, T ]. The costs associated with uˆ and (ui, uˆ−i) are, respectively, given by
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
t
uˆ2i (s)ds
]
+
γ
2
E
[
Xˆt,xii (T )− Γ1xi − Γ2Xˆ(−i)(T )
]2
,
J i,N (t, xi;ui, uˆ−i) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
t
u2i (s)ds
]
+
γ
2
E
[
Xt,xii (T )− Γ1xi − Γ2(Xˆ(−i)(T ))
]2
.
The difference can be written as
J i,N (t, xi;ui, uˆ−i)− J i,N (t, xi; uˆ) = 1
2
E
[∫ T
t
u2i (s)ds
]
+
γ
2
E
[
Xt,xii (T )− Γ1xi − Γ2X¯T
]2
−1
2
E
[∫ T
t
uˆ2i (s)ds
]
− γ
2
E
[
Xˆt,xii (T )− Γ1xi − Γ2X¯T
]2
+dN ,
where
dN = γΓ2E
[
(Xˆt,xii (T )−Xt,xii (T ))(Xˆ(−i)(T )− X¯T )
]
.
For any fixed ui ∈ U0[0, T ], we can still prove Lemma 6.1. Corollary 6.1 also holds for uˆj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N .
We have
|dN | ≤ γΓ2(E|Xˆt,xii (T )−Xt,xii (T )|2)1/2(E|Xˆ(−i)(T )− X¯T |2)1/2
≤ Cε√
N − 1 ,
where C may depend on ui. If ui ∈ U [0, T ] were considered, we would be unable to obtain the
second inequality above. Finally,
lim
ε↓0
J i,N (t, xi; uˆ)− J i,N (t, xi;ui, uˆ−i)
ε
≤ C√
N − 1 .
Thus, uˆ is an asymptotic sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium point.
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